S54 
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IE AHITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD 
THE RETENTION BY EUROPEAN NATIONS OF 
COLONIES IN AND AROUND THE CARIBBEAN 



BV 

WILLIAM R. SHEPHERD 

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 



REPRINTED FROM 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 

ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
Vol. VII, No. 2 



NEW YORK 

PUBLISHED BY THE 

ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 

1917 



THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD 

THE RETENTION BY EUROPEAN NATIONS OF 

COLONIES IN AND AROUND THE CARIBBEAN 



BY 

WILLIAM R. SHEPHERD 

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 



REPRINTED FROM 

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 

ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
Vol. VII, No. 2 



NEW YORK 

PUBLISHED BY THE 

ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 

1917 




r ^1^ i 



THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD 

THE RETENTION BY EUROPEAN NATIONS 

OF COLONIES IN AND AROUND THE 

CARIBBEAN ^ 

WILLIAM R. SHEPHERD 
Professor of History, Columbia University 

EAST and south of the United States of America stretches 
a long chain of insular and continental areas belonging 
to Great Britain, France and the Netherlands. One 
end of it is anchored in the ocean, 580 miles east of North 
Carolina; the other is wedged into Central America, midway 
between Florida and Texas, 450 miles to the southward. 
Starting at Bermuda and extending down to the north coast 
of South America, the chain runs through hundreds of islands, 
which if pieced together, would about equal Connecticut and 
New Jersey combined, thence through the Guianas, a region 
much larger than California, and around to British Honduras, 
a territory not far from the size of New Hampshire. The 
entire Caribbean area would just about fit into the New Eng- 
land and Middle Atlantic states, plus West Virginia. 

In these dependencies of island and mainland live some 
'2,750,000 people, about as many as Indiana contains in an 
area less than one fifth as large. A more extraordinary mix 
ture of races, colors and religions, a more singular juxtaposition 
of oriental and occidental, of folk from Europe, Africa, Asia 
and the South Sea Isles, all brought face to face in Americ 
it would be hard to find anywhere in the world. Beneath the 
thin crust of a few thousand whites, of British, French, Dutch, 
Spanish and Portuguese origin, are massed millions of negroes 
and mulattoes, hundreds of thousands of Hindus, tens of 
thousands of Javanese, and thousands of Chinese, Siamese and 

1 Address delivered at the N.itional Conference on Foreign Relations of the 
United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, 
at Long Beach, N. Y., May 30, 191 7. 




EUROPEAN RETENTION OF CARIBBEAN COLONIES 20I 

Indians. Here are black, brown, red and yellow Christians, 
Mohammedans and Jews, devotees of Brahma and Buddha, 
followers of Confucius, and worshippers of nature, transplanted 
from Africa and Asia, made dwellers in America, and yet 
owning allegiance to European masters. 

The future of these lands and peoples is a matter of vital 
concern to the United States. The reason for it lies in the 
observance of the sound national principle that small areas 
located near the territory of a great power should belong to it, 
rather than to a distant country. Were such areas actually 
independent states having a strong national life, states whose 
achievements had long since won the respect and recognition 
of the world at large, as is true of several of the small coun- 
tries of Europe, the principle, obviously, would be altogether 
inapplicable. Where, however, these conditions are not ful- 
filled, as in the case of the chain of insular and continental de- 
pendencies in America, extending all the way around from 
Bermuda to British Honduras, inclusive, the principle seems 
clearly befitting. In its application to this collective territory 
three parties are concerned, and three sets of interests would 
have to be adjusted. The parties are the United States, the 
present European owners, and the colonial inhabitants them- 
selves. The interests have to do with the position of the 
United States as the chief among American nations; with the 
strengthening of the bonds of friendship between this country 
and Great Britain, France and the Netherlands, and with the 
welfare of the dependent peoples in question. 

The Caribbean Sea is the gateway to the Panama Canal. - 
Until recently there were four links in the European chain \ 
across its entrance. One of them has been acquired through ^ 
the purchase of the islands from Denmark. Sooner or later 
the other three links must pass into the possession of the 
United States, and the Caribbean Sea be made into an 
American lake. Manifest destiny, the natural course of things, 
of whatever the term that may be used to mark the tendency of 
great powers to round out their defensible frontiers, will deter- 
mine the matter in any event. If so, it behooves American /-■ 
diplomacy to start taking stock of the future. In the Carib- 



202 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII 

bean region, and wherever else in fact American interests are 
vitally concerned, the United States should adopt as soon as 
practicable a definite policy, and abandon once and for all the 
drifting opportunism that only too often in recent years has 
characterized our foreign relations. 

Now, just as there are three parties and three sets of inter- 
ests involved, so there are three circumstances that should de- 
termine the attitude of the United States toward the retention 
by European nations of colonies in and around the Caribbean. 
The first circumstance is, that we need those areas ourselves; 
the second is, that the European owners do not ; and the third 
is a natural consequence of the two preceding, namely, that the 
owners ought to turn them over to us for the good of all 
concerned. 

Geographically the Caribbean colonies, using the expression 
broadly, belong to the American continents. Because nature 
happened to separate them by water is no reason why nations 
should separate them by claims, from the region of which they 
are properly a part. Because of their nearness to the territor)^ 
of the United States and to the Panama Canal, and because of 
their remoteness from the territory of their possessors, this 
country has, and ought to have, a paramount interest in their 
destiny, both for its own sake and for theirs. Naturally and 
strategically a part of the United States, they are a potential 
menace to its welfare and security so long as they remain un- 
der European control. 

At this point the objection may be raised, that neither to 
the United States nor to the Panama Canal is the slightest 
danger likely to arise from tlie fact that the colonies are the 
property of Great Britain, France and the Netherlands. The 
present relationship of this country to the two great powers in 
question, and our historic friendship with France above all, 
are a guaranty suflicient in itself to ward off any apprehensions 
about the future. It is inconceivable that cither of them would 
ever attack the United States. 

In reply to these contentions one may freely admit that, 
if no possible danger could exist that the Caribbean colonies 
would ever be used as a base of hostile operations against this 



No. 2]/ EUROPEAN RETENTION OF CARIBBEAN COLONIES 203 

country, they might be left in the hands of their present owners. 
Obviously, however, this assurance cannot be guaranteed, no 
matter what the sentiment now prevailing between the United 
States and the three European nations in question. " It is a | 
maxim, founded on the universal experience of mankind," | 
wrote Washington in 1778, "that no nation is to be trusted | 
farther than it is bound by its interest; and no prudent states- ' 
man or politician will venture to depart from it." Inter- 
national agreements and understandings are too easily changed ':, 
under the pressure of new circumstances to justify a placid 
confidence in the notion that the hopes and desires of today 
are bound to become the absolute certainties of tomorrow. It 
was inconceivable that the Great War and all its horrors, with 
all the fundamental readjustments it has v/rought in ideas, 
relationships, values and sympathies, could have happened. 
The inconceivable has happened, and will continue to happen 
just as long as men and affairs in this world are subject to / 
change, with or without warning. But surely the United I 
States need not be afraid of the little Netherlands. Neither | 
was it afraid of little Benmiark, yet it bought the Danish West I 
Indies, nevertheless, for motives of prudence and a consider- | 
able sum in cash ! Though we feared nothing from Denmark, 
of course, we could not be sure but that some power stronger, 
and in a position to be more ambitious, than that worthy bit 
of Scandinavia, might become interested in insular real estate 
near the American coast. Preparing for things possibly even- 
tual, therefore, is a safer and wiser practice than dreaming 
about things presumably inconceivable. 

The Panama Canal, be it said, was not constructed as an 
evidence merely of American facility in severing continents and 
uniting oceans. Neither was it built solely as a convenient'1 
economizer of time and space for the world's commerce. It is! 
an American highway put through by American brains, Ameri- 1 
can labor and American money for the general good of man- 1 
kind in time of peace, and for the specific good of the United f 
States in time of war. With the freedom of the seas it is free I 
and correspondingly neutral; but so long as it is easily open I 
to attack from islands and continental areas near by, which 



204 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII 

belong to European countries at a time when the seas happen 
not to be free, it is neither neutral nor properly subject to 
neutralization. 

The Caribbean areas resemble a huge pair of dividers or 
pincers, between the points or nippers of which are thirty de- 
grees of latitude and thirty-eight degrees of longitude, and 
the head or handle of which rests on the Guianas. To be sure, 
we have certain islands lying in the region which can obstruct 
any tendency on the part of the dividers or pincers to close 
down on American land or American water; but obstruction 
is not by any means so effective a safeguard against seizure 
or compression by the big pliers, as would be our downright 
ownership of the pliers. 

Here again it might be suggested that, instead of seeking to 
obtain possession of the Caribbean colonies as a measure of 
strategic defense for the Panama Canal, the United States 
should endeavor to ward off foreign cupidity by having the 
waterway neutralized. Such a suggestion, however, coming 
in the light of recent experience in the eastern hemisphere, 
takes on the garb of the things that were supposed to be in- 
j conceivable. Neutralization as applied on the continent of 
Europe, certainly, has been honored far more in the breach 
than in the observance. And in the case of the Suez Canal, 
which was guaranteed, by solemn international agreements in 
1888 and 1904, open to the ships of all nations alike in war 
'and in peace, neutralization since 1914 has not been especially 
noticeable. German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turk- 
C'ish vessels have found it quite impracticable as a neutral route 
to India and beyond! Until that happy day shall dawn, 1 
therefore, when freedom of the seas is something more than a ', 
rhetorical expression, when it has actually the same meaning ; 
in war that it has in peace, and when the neutralized Suez 
Canal stays neutralized in both periods, then it will be feasible 
to discuss the neutralization of the Panama Canal. By that 
time, let us hope, the stars and stripes will wave over the 
European colonies in and around the Caribbean ; and we shall 
not have to worry about the safety of our southern waterway. 



No. 2] EUROPEAN RETENTION OF CARIBBEAN COLONIES 205 

But the people of the United States have something more to 
consider than their territory and their canal. Nature and 
history have appointed us protectors, under the Monroe Doc- 
trine, of twenty sister republics in America. Prudence and 
foresight, accordingly, require that anything in the shape of 
a potential danger to them or to ourselves ought to be removed 
in peaceable fashion, whenever a suitable opportunity offers 
itself to that end. 

Valuable though the West Indian region may have been for 
economic and political reasons to Great Britain, France and 
the Netherlands, it ceased long ago to occupy an important 
place in their national affairs. No elaborate demonstration 
is needed to show that what was of service to them in the 
eighteenth century is of small account today. At that time 
the United States was a tiny republic whose chances for per- 
manence and development were thought highly doubtful ; now 
it is one of the great powers of earth. It holds, furthermore, 
a unique position, in that it has become altogether the para- 
mount nation in one hemisphere, whereas its fellows contend 
among themselves for supremacy in the other. This status of 
leadership in the New World the United States is bound to 
maintain, in the interest of the Americas at large no less than 
in its own. 

The Monroe Doctrine laid down three fairly definite prin- 
ciples that constitute a special phase of our relationship to the 
Latin American countries and to the powers of Europe and 
Asia. As properly interpreted and expanded since their 
enunciation in 1823, they have been made to forbid the trans- 
ference of territory owned by an American republic to a non- 
American country, and to forbid even the temporary occupa- 
tion of any part of an American republic by a non-American 
country on any pretext whatever. All this has been done in 
the interest of the pax Americana, of an intercontinental peace 
that shall keep the Americas free from an extension to them 
and among them of troubles born of Europe. 

For the welfare of the United States and its sister republics 
American soil is not available for future European or Asiatic 
colonization. Now, as the centennial anniversary of the 



2o6 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII 

Monroe Doctrine draws near, the change in circumstances to- 
ward the close of a hundred years would seem to justify us in 
seeking to have the peace of the Americas further assured. 
This can be done through a friendly agreement with the 
countries concerned, whereby the future retention by European 
nations of colonies in and around the Caribbean shall no 
longer be a source of possible disquiet, either for ourselves or 
for our Latin American neighbors. 

Instead of causing the Monroe Doctrine thereby to be 
abandoned, or even ignored, as some objectors might urge, 
such a procedure as the one suggested would, on the contrary, 
carry it out to its logical conclusion. By the actual terms of 
the doctrine the European colonies in America existing at the 
time of its pronouncement were to remain in the hands of their 
owners; but the underlying presumption must have been that 
this retention was a temporaiy matter, and hence subject to 
discontinuance whenever feasible. If this be true, the acquisi- 
tion of the Caribbean areas in question by the United States 
v\^ould serve to round out the Monroe Doctrine by making its 
basic idea, that of the eventual exclusion of non-American 
political power over American soil, a realit}^, and the thought 
of "America for the Americans," an accomplished fact. 

That the retirement of the European nations from the Carib- 
bean and, in consequence, their replacement by the United 
States, might intensify the fear of " Yankee imperialism " 
among the Latin American republics, is possible in the case 
of those lying in that sea, or bordering upon the western 
part of it, but highly improbable so far as the countries 
to the southward are concerned. The insular republics, 
certainly, and some of those in Central America, have 
already lost their independence in some degree, as the 
process of financial, police and sanitary control, along 
with the extension of the commercial influence of the 
United States, goes, glacier-like, slowly onward. Were the 
European colonies in their neighborhood to be acquired by 
this country, the effect, conceivably, might be that of giving 
an impetus to the present policy of establishing quasi-protec- 
torates over the republics in question, as the most suitable 



No. 2] EUROPEAN RETENTION OF CARIBBEAN COLONIES 207 

means of providing for their welfare and security. On the 
other hand, the great progressive Latin American states, those 
possessing the elements needful for an efficient national de- 
velopment, have no reason to worry about the outcome of this 
particular phase of manifest destiny; nor is it likely that, in 
any essential respect, they would feel much concerned. Apart 
from sentimental considerations, more or less vague, arising out 
of the relationships of colonial times, they have comparatively 
scant interest in the affairs of the small, backward republics 
of Spanish or French speech lying in and around the Carib- 
bean. For the insular and continental dependencies of Great 
Britain, France and the Netherlands in the same area, to which 
no such considerations are applicable, their concern would be 
much less still. Indeed, if the United States were to obtain 
these dependencies in peaceable fashion, the chief Latin 
American nations might be inclined rather to approve the ac- 
tion, as a final step in realizing the fundamental concept of 
the Monroe Doctrine to which they subscribe. 

The United States, moreover, has associated itself with 
the Allies in their war against the Central Powers. Repre- ! \ 
sentatives of Great Britain and France have besought our : \ 
aid in ships, men, money and supplies. If they, in common . l 
with their supporters in Europe and their Far Eastern ally, | I 
Japan, are waging the war wholly for altruistic purposes, if ; p. 
they expect no advantage, other than the knowledge that 
libert)^, democrac}^, humanity and civilization shall have been 
won for the world at large, then the United States surely can 
afford to imitate their example. On the other hand, if Great 
Britain and France are to derive material compensation from 
a victory rendered certain by the opportune aid of the United 
States, it is only fair and just that, in accordance with terms 
acceptable to all parties concerned, they turn over their Carib- 
bean possessions to this country as a fitting token of gratitude 
for our support. 

In the case of the Netherlands the precedent already set by 
the purchase of the islands from Denmark could be applied to 
the acquisition of the Dutch territories. At this point, how- 
ever, a financial caveat must be entered. Preliminary to our 



2o8 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII 

participation in the war we paid Denmark $25,000,000 for 
138 square miles of insular land. Since the Dutch West 
Indies spread over 46,463 square miles, were they to be ac- 
quired at the same rate, as a possible outcome of the war, they 
would cost about $8,500,000,000, which is somewhat mor'e than 
[ we could afford! Accordingly, whenever the moment for 
I negotiation comes, we shall have to arrange for a different 
I basis of adjustment, as for example, one determined by the 
amount of the subsidies which the Dutch government has to 
pay each year into the colonial treasuries. 

Returning to the consideration of the British and French 
aspect of the matter, one meets with two classes of objections. 
Some will assert that it is unfair to take advantage of Great 
Britain and France, distressed by the devastation of a war 
waged, not alone in their own behalf, but in defense of the 
United States as well. Whether in fact they have been de- 
I fending this country, must be left to the verdict of history when 
! the war is over. Many of us, at all events, believe this to be 
true. On the other hand, it is probably just as true that, 
without the aid we have already furnished and shall continue 
to furnish, Great Britain and France could not have defended 
themselves alone, to say nothing of the United States. To 
pledge the colonies in and around the Caribbean, accordingly, 
as a return for aid extended, is not to take advantage of na- 
tional distress; it is a plain business proposition, like the ex- 
tension of the aid itself. 

Other objections to the plan proposed will maintain that, 
even if Great Britain and France should receive ample com- 
pensation in territory and money as the reward of victor)^, that 
is no reason why the United States should do so. Our aims, 
they will assert, are and ought to be purely idealistic, and hence 
free from material considerations of any sort. Let the Euro- 
pean nations and Japan take what they can get; as for our- 
selves, we shall take nothing. Unfortunately for the force of 
such a contention, however, this grimly practical world is not 
run on the basis that virtue is its own reward. Sentiment and 
emotion may shape the thoughts of individuals amid the multi- 
tudes, but they do not determine the course of action followed 



No. 2] EUROPEAN RETENTION OF CARIBBEAN COLONIES 209 

by the soldiers in the field, and by the statesmen seated around 
the green cloth table, who are called upon to decide what is 
best for their country. If the European nations and Japan are 
to secure means for their material advancement as a result of 
this war, the essential interests of the United States require it 
to obtain similar advantages for itself. 

Assuming that these objections have been overcome, four 
more of them are likely to be encountered. In the first place, 
Great Britain, France and the Netherlands would never be 
willing to turn over their colonies in and around the Caribbean 
to the United States, no matter how much we may want them 
to do so. Second, the colonies are better off in their present 
situation than they would be under American direction. Third, 
we have no desire, either to increase the burden of our race 
problem by trying to govern two millions and more of colored 
peoples, or to enlarge tasks already great enough, by the duty 
of protecting a large number of scattered islands and parts of 
continents. In the last place, areas so famous for earth- 
quakes and hurricanes are probably not worth the trouble and 
expense needful for their acquisition. Of these objections, the 
first is a pure assumption; the second is like unto it; the third 
ignores what we have done so successfully both in Porto Rico 
and the Philippines ; and the fourth is erroneous. •.h,^_^ 

As colonization is carried on today, the real test of the %. 
right of a European nation to retain control of American \ 
territories, like those in and around the Caribbean, is deter- \ 
mined, not alone by their actual utility to the nation in ques- 1 

tion, but by the amount of service thus rendered to their in- 
habitants. For many years past Great Britain, France and 
the Netherlands have centered their oversea activities in the 
eastern hemisphere, in Africa, Asia, Australia and Polynesia. 
The islands and parts of continents they hold in the Caribbean] 
region are little more than relics of ancient grandeur, burden- 
some rather than a source of advantage. No sentimental value' 
worth mentioning attaches to these areas. Few Englishmen, 
Frenchmen or Dutchmen reside in them longer than is neces- 
sary for commercial purposes. Possibly the colonies may have i 
some strategic value to their owners as naval bases. If so, 



2IO CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII 

against what power? This is an obvious question that has an 
obvious answer — the United States. In that case no doubt re- 
mains as to our duty in the premises ! 

Practically all the Caribbean colonies have fallen long since 
into a state of absolute or relative neglect. Their population 
either crowds the means of subsistence or tends steadily to 
I fall off. That any of the areas flourish at all is due mainly 
/ to their connection with the United States and to the intro- 
■J duction of Asiatics for work on the plantations. The trade of 
I the British possessions with this countr}^ is worth upwards of 
1 $4,000,000 a year more than that with Great Britain itself, 
! and if British Guinana is excepted, more than $13,000,000. 
In the case of British Guiana the reason for the larger amount 
of commerce carried on with the mother country is found in the 
labor of Asiatics. Both here and in Jamaica, as well as in the 
French and Dutch colonies, the practice of using orientals pre- 
vails. However legitimate the bringing over to America of 
Hindus, Japanese, Siamese and Chinese by the tens and hun- 
dreds of thousands may seem to the British, Dutch and French 
owners of the Caribbean region, it is altogether opposed to the 
principles which the United States has steadfastly championed 
in defense of the Ajmerican workingman. Legitimate it may 
be in point of lavi^, though not in point of morals; for its ob- 
ject is, not the advancement of civilization in the areas con- 
cerned, but solely the exploitation of them by the agency of 
cheap labor. 

Railroads, furthermore, almost unknown in the islands, 
are relatively much scarcer still in the continental sections. 
British Guiana, which is somewhat smaller than Oregon, has 
97^ miles of railway, run on three different gauges; British 
Honduras has 25 miles; Dutch Guiana, about as big as New- 
York — for which, by the way, it was exchanged back in 1667 
— has 104 miles, whereas French Guiana, a bit larger than 
Maine, has no railways at all. Both the French and the Dutch 
colonies show a declining commerce and they are dependent, 
also, for their financial existence upon annual subsidies fur- 
nished by the home government. To recognize therefore 
that, economically at least, the British territories already form 



No. 2] EUROPEAN RETENTION OF CARIBBEAN COLONIES 2II 

part of the United States, and to relieve the taxpayers of 
France and the Netherlands of the burden of meeting the 
deficits of their backward dependencies in America, would not 
seem on the face of it an unwelcome act. 

Nor is this all of the story. None of the British colonies 
in and around the Caribbean enjoys self-government in any- 
thing like the measure of it accorded to Canada and Newfound- : 
land. So far as the privilege is granted at all, the people thus 
favored stand more or less on a level with the inhabitants of 
India. In the French and Dutch areas the situation is worse. 
Even if the French colonists are represented in the home par- 
liament, the representation is illusory rather than otherwise, 
whereas the folk under Dutch rule have to depend on what the 
good queen sends them. Whatever the amount of attention, 
also, given to education in the British possessions, it is pitiably 
scant among their French and Dutch neighbors. In partial 
compensation for the drawbacks, however, many of the in- 
habitants speak English after the American fashion, and use 
dollars and cents more commonly than they do pounds, shill- 
ings and pence, francs and guilders ! 

Given these circumstances, it seems clear that, taken as a 
wKoTeTTRje'colonies in and around the Caribbean are a loss to 
t3Tfe" European nations that own them, and a detriment to the 
p'Sbple'who liV'e in them. Were they to be made, instead, a part 
of the United States in the political sense, as essentially they 
already are a part of it in the geographical, linguistic and 
economic sense, their lot would be a happier one, and so would 
ours. Were they to be included in the American union, there 
is every reason to believe that the benefits which have followed 
the American occupation of Porto Rico would be extended to 
them also. What we have accomplished in nineteen years for 
. the material, mental and moral advantage of that island and 
its American citizenry, needs no expatiation here, for the evi- 
dence is too well known. If the destinies of the Caribbean 
colonies, therefore, were committed to our charge, we could 
assure to their inhabitants an interest in their welfare which 
the countries now ruling them cannot possibly display. 



212 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII 

And what have the Caribbean islands and the mainland to 
offer us ? They have many an excellent harbor. They afford 
an outlet for the surplus population of Porto Rico. They are 
rich in the natural resources of the tropics, which we shall need 
in ever-increasing amount. The more these resources are de- 
veloped, the greater becomes the market for our manufactures. 
American railways in the Guianas would open to the Caribbean 
seaboard the treasures of the Amazon valley. Benign in 
climate and beautiful in scenery, the Caribbean islands have 
extraordinary possibilities as winter resorts. Nor are they 
lacking in historic interest. Among the islands and on the 
Spanish Main were laid the scenes in song and story of the 
brave old times of the pirate and buccaneer, of the age-long 
struggle in former days of the states of Europe for dominion 
in the New World. 

Assuming that, in view of all the foregoing, Great Britain, 
France and the Netherlands shall have signified a willingness 
to relinquish their ownership of the Caribbean colonies in favor 
of the United States, we might set a worthy example of our 
belief in the principle that governments derive their just powers 
from the consent of the governed. The American people think 
that small nationalities ought to have the right to determine 
their own destinies. If their conditions are such as to make 
independence desirable, they should be independent; if not, 
then they should be permitted to choose the allegiance under 
which they shall live. That in any correct or reasonable 
sense of the term the people dwelling in the Caribbean colonies 
can be called " nationalities," however, is altogether doubtful. 
No one has ever thought of regarding them in that light; for 
they possess few, if any, of the qualifications requisite for that 
distinction. Dependent they always have been, and dependent 
they are likely to remain, since the conditions for independ 
ence are lacking. Accordingly, if the several areas they in 
habit were to be transferred from their present owners to the 
United States by virtue of an agreement between the two parties 
concerned, the act in itself could not be construed as a viola- 
tion of the American principle of championing the cause of 
small nations. Yet, in order to remove any possible hesita- 



t 

1 



No. 2] EUROPEAN RETENTION OF CARIBBEAN COLONIES 213 

tion on this point, whenever the moment for the ultimate dis- 
posal of the Caribbean colonies arrives, the question whether 
they should be placed under the protection of the stars and 
stripes might be resolved, if practicable, in democratic fashion, 
by leaving it to the decision of the people themselves. That 
they would vote right on a matter that affects so intimately their 
welfare and progress cannot be doubted. 




015 807 128 



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IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK 



BOARD OF TRUSTEES 

President 
Samobl McCunb LlIfDSAT 



Albert Shaw 



Vice-Presidents 

Thomas W. Lamont 



Secretary 
Henry Ratoiond Mussey 



Directors 



Irving T. Bush 
James Byrne 
A. Barton Hepburn 
Charles E. Hughes 
Adolph Lewisohn 
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Treasurer 
Qeorge a. Plimpton 

Henry R. Seager 
Edwin R. A. Sbligman 
William R. Shepherd 
Munrob Smith 
Henry L. Stimson 
Frank A. Vandbrlip 



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